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STUDENT NOTES AND CO.MMENTS
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
AND
DEFENDANT'S ANTECEDENT NEGLIGENCE
The doctrine of last clear chance is one of the principal methods by which
the courts have modified the strictness of the rule that contributory negligence
precludes a plaintiff from recovering from a negligent defendant. The basic doc-
trine is that the defendant is liable notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence if
the defendant discovered the plaintiff in a position of helpless peril in time to
have avoided injuring the plaintiff had the defendant exercised reasonable care
after such discovery. Many courts have extended the doctrine to allow the
plaintiff to recover where the defendant should have discovered the plaintiff's
peril but negligently failed to do so, and a few courts allow recovery where the
plaintiff was merely negligently unaware of Is own peril.' The doctrine had its
origin in the stress placed upon the time sequence, since it was felt that a plain-
tiff should not be denied a recovery because of his contributory negligence when
the defendant had the later opportunity to avoid the injury. Therefore, in its
general application, the defendant is liable only if is failure to avoid injuring the
plaintiff was due to some negligence on is part after he discovered or should
have discovered the plaintiff's peril; the defendant's negligence must follow or at
least concur with that of the plaintiff.
British Columbia Electric Ry. v. Loach" was a case which departed from this
general application. In this case, decided in 1916 by the Privy Council, the
defendant's streetcar was traveling at a negligent rate of speed and had defective
brakes. The plaintiff negligently started to cross the defendant's car tracks at a
public crossing. Although the driver of the streetcar saw the plaintiff's peril as
,oon as he could have reasonably been expected to and immediately applied the
hrakes, he was unable to avoid hitting the plaintiff because of the defective brakes
and excessive speed. The court held that, while the negligence of the defendant
vas antecedent to that of the plaintiff, it was the "ultimate" negligence, and the
defendant had the last clear chance.' The English court, in this case, extended
its application of the last clear chance doctrine to that situation where the de-
fendant, after he discovered the plaintiff's peril, could have avoided injuring the
plaintiff by exercising reasonable care had not is negligence before that time made
it impossible for him to avoid such injury.
Although a majority of American jurisdictions have refused to accept the
doctrine of the Loach case,' a few have held the defendant liable in such a situa-
tion. In most of the cases which have so held, the defendant's negligence con-
sisted of operating his train, streetcar, or automobile negligently in one of these
four respects: with an inadequate headlight, with defective brakes, with dan-
gerous equipment, or at an excessive speed.
In Lloyd v. Albermarle & R. R.,' the engineer of the defendant's train did
not see the plaintiff, who was in a helpless position on the defendant's trestle due
to his own negligence, because the defendant had ngligently failed to provide its
train with a proper headlight. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held the
defendant liable under the last clear chance doctrine. The Vermont court, in an
almost identical fact situation, also allowed the plaintiff to recover.' These cases,
POitos it, TORiS sec. 54 (1941).
[1916] 1 A. C. 719 (P C.)
The Canadian courts have disagreed as to whether this case is authority for
allowing recovery where the defendant's only negligence was excessive speed. That
it i%. Jeremy and Jeremy v. Foutaine, [19311 3 V W R. 203 (Alta.); Critchley v.
Canadian Northern Rv., [1917] 2 IW IV R. 538, 34 D. L. R. 245 (Alta.). That it
is not: Smith x. City of Regina, 1917] I W W R. 1444, 34 D. L. R. 238, aff'd,
[1918] 2 NV W R. 1010, 11 Sask. L. R. 291, -12 D. L. R. 647 (Sask.).
PRossiR, TORIS sec. 51 (1941).
S118 N. C. 1010, 24 S. E. 805 (1896).
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where the defendants negligence was an omission which made it impossible to
discover the plaintiffs in peril, have been accepted by some authorities as con-
sistent with previous views of last clear chance, either on the ground that the
defendants were under a duty to maintain a proper lookout and they should not
have been allowed to avoid this duty by their failure to provide adequate equip-
ment to make this lookout effective,' or on the ground that the defendants were
guilty of "continuing negligence" and were thus negligent after they should, in
the exercise of due care, have discovered the plantiffs m peril.'
In Little Rock Traction & Electric Co. v. Morrison,' the Supreme Court of
Arkansas held that the plaintiff could recover on the last clear chance theory if
the defendant was negligent in having an inexperienced motorman or defective
brakes, and in Thompson v. Salt Lake City Rapid-Transit Co." the Utah court
allowed a recovery where the plaintiff was negligent, but the defendant was unable
to avoid the injury because of defective brakes and a defective motor. In Ohio, a
defendant railroad has been held liable because its train was improperly equipped
with air brakes, a statutory violation, even though the plaintiff was also negligent, 5
and in Weitzman v. Nassau Electric R. Co.," a New York case, the court said that
while it was not necessary to the decision of the case, the law in New York was
that the plaintiff could recover despite contributory negligence if the injury could
have been avoided had the defendant's streetcar been properly equipped with
brakes."
In two North Carolina cases, the defendants were held liable, despite the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs, where the injuries were due to dangerous
equipment on the defendants instrumentalities. In Smith v. Charlotte Electric
Ry.,"' the defendant's streetcar had an inadequate and dangerous fender, and in
Greenlee v. Southern Ry.,' the defendant's train was not equipped with self-
couplers as required by statute.
The Montana court and the Missouri court have each held that a negligent
plaintiff may recover if the defendant's train was traveling at an excessive rate of
speed and the injury could have been prevented had the train been traveling at a
reasonable speed when the plaintiff's peril was discovered or should have been
discovered.'" The decisions in Hall v. Ogden Street Ry.," a Utah case, and
"Dent v. Bellows Falls & S. R. St. Ry., 95 Vt. 523, 116 Ad. 83 (1922).
-See Hmxu'ER, TOTs sec. 139 (1933); REsT., ToRrs, EXPLANATORY NOTES sec. 15,
comment f, p. 74 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1933), "But where the defendant's ante-
cedent negligence consists in a failure to provide adequate equipment to discover
the helpless peril of the plantiff, there is liability notwithstanding the de
fendant used all facilities within his power to avoid the harm after actual discovery.
Kis failure to discover by reason of his negligently defective equipment brings him
within the rule of failing to use due care after the plantiff's peril ought to have
been discovered. Section 15 imposes an affirmative duty to employ reasonable
care to discover a negligent plaintiff's peril, 'but the duty would not be
discharged by vigilant watch in the absence of means to make the look-out
effectual' "
'See Note, 92 A. L. R. 47 58 (1934).
'69 Ark. 289, 62 S. W 1045 (1901).
1o 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92 (1898).
"Fairport P 9: E. R. Co. v. Meredith, 46 Ohio App. 457, 189 N. E. 10 (1933),
afrd., 292 U. S. 589 (1934) (applying state law).
" 33 App. Div. 585, 53 N. Y. Supp. 905 (2d Dep't. 1898).
"Id., at ., 53 N. Y. Supp. at 906.
173 N. C. 489, 92 S. E. 382 (1917).
"122 N. C. 977 30 S. E. 115 (1898).
16Neary v. Northern Pac. Ry., 41 Mont. 480, 110 Pac. 226 (1910); Goben v.
Quincy 0. & K. C. R. Co., 206 Mo. App. 5, 226 S. W 631 (1920); Moore v. St.
Louis Transit Co., 95 Mo. App 728, 75 S. W. 699 (1902), aff'd., 194 Mo. 1, 92 S. W
390 (1906) (streetcar).
I- Utah 243, 44 Pac. 1046 (1896).
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Baltimore Consolidated Ry. v. Rifcowitz, " a Maryland case, might be explained
on the ground that the defendant failed to maintain a proper lookout, but the
court, in each case, discussed the defendant's negligent speed before the plaintiff
was imperiled, and implied that the jury might consider such negligence even if
the plaintiff was negligent also. This was also implied by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Colorado & Southern Ry. v. Western Light & Power Co." The Kentucky
Court of Appeals, in Kelly v. Marshall's Adm r.,"- approved an instruction allowing
the plaintiff to recover, even if guilty of contributory negligence, if the defendant
could have avoided the injury, had his car been runmng at a reasonable rate of
speed. In Stephens v. Glass, -' another Kentucky case, the plaintiff drove his car
from a side road onto the highway, and the defendant was unable to avoid hitting
him because the defendant's automobile was traveling at an excessive rate of
speed. The court held that the plaintiff could recover, even if negligent, because
the plaintiff's negligence would not have produced the collision except for the
negligence of the defendant and, thus, was not the proximate cause of the injury.2
The court, in that case, while treating it as an ordinary proximate cause question,
seems to have applied the last clear chance doctrine where the defendant's negli-
gence was antecedent to the plaintiff's.'
These last two cases were the only cases found by the writer in which the
defendant was held liable on the last clear chance theory for his antecedent negli-
gence where his instrumentality was an automobile.
A case which does not fall into any of the typical situations discussed before
is Brotherton v. Manhattan Beach Improvement Co.,' a Nebraska case. The de-
fendant, in that case, operated a bathing beach, but did not have a lifeguard at
the beach. When informed that the plaintiff's intestate, who had been swimmung
there, was missing, the defendant did not institute a search for some time. The
court ruled that the defendant could be held liable even if the plaintiff's intestate
had been negligent, because the defendant should have had a lifeguard present
when decedent "placed himself in such a situation that his life was in danger,"
or at least should have instituted a search when informed that plaintiff's intestate
was missing. Although the court stressed the failure of the defendant to act after
notice, it appears from the court's repeated reference, in its opimon, to the de-
fendant's failure to have a lifeguard that such failure might, m itself, have been
sufficient negligence to hold the defendant liable despite any contributory
negligence.
1'89 Md. 338, 43 At. 762 (1899).
'73 Colo. 107 214 Pac. 30 (1923).
-274 KN. 666. 120 S. W. 2d 142 (1938). The court also asserted that the de-
cundant was negligent in that he " at no time slackened the speed of the taxi."
Failure of the defendant to slacken speed after discovery of the plaintiff would
,eci to be irrelevant to the cause of the injury unless the defendant could thereby
bave avoided the injury. If he could have, then this is an ordinary last clear
chance case and not one in which defendant was held liable for his antecedent
negligence.
"296 Ky. 90. 176 S. W 2d 139 (1943).
In this case, the trial court seems to have left the case to the jury under the
broad i-sue of proxiuate cause, and the Court of Appeals found a support for the
lury s verdict by taking a sort of judicial notice that i" t has been the experi-
(nce of this court that excessive speed at which automobiles travel the highways
of the country is by far the greater cause of highway collisions "I d., at 93,
176 S. W. 2d at 141.
1'See Note, 33 Ky. L. J. 132 (1944) for a view that another Kentucky case,
Chc'apeak & 0. RN. v. Pope, 296 Ky. 254, 176 S. I 2d 876 (1943), is an application
of the last clear chance doctrine where defendant's negligence was antecedent,
although the Kentucky Court of Appeals treated it as an ordinary proximate
cause question.
X 18 Neb. 563, 67 N. W 479 (1896).
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While some of the states mentioned above seem to have allowed recovery
where the defendant's negligence was antecedent, in a few of them there are
conflicting decisions. In New York, where it was said by way of dictum in the
Weitzman case' that recovery would be allowed if the defendant's instrumentality
had defective brakes, a later New York case demed recovery in such a situation."'
In Kentucky, where recovery has been allowed when the defendant's speed was
excessive, recovery has been demed in cases of excessive speed decided both
before and since those in which recovery was allowed,"' although there has been
no express reversal, and the Kentucky court has also refused to hold the defendant
liable in other situations where his negligence was antecedent.' In Missouri,
where recovery has been allowed because of the defendant's excessive speed, it
has also been demed-7
The rule of the Loach case 7 is now the law in England and Canada" The
extreme to which it has been applied is shown by Stebbe v. Laird," a case de-
cided by the Manitoba court. In that case, the plaintiff's intestate was one of a
group of children walking along the side of a highway. The defendant, ap-
proaching the group in his automobile, sounded his horn while seventy-five yards
away but did not again sound it. As he was about to pass the group, the plain-
tiff's intestate walked in front of his car, and although the defendant turned his
car to avoid hitting her, the side of it did hit her. The court held that the plain-
tiff could recover even though there was contributory negligence, because the
defendant had not given sufficient warmng of his approach.
It is submitted that the law applied to the cases discussed, excepting the
cases involving an inadequate headlight, cannot logically be made a part of
the last clear chance doctrine, since the defendant does not, in fact, have the last
chance. At the time that the plaintiff is negligent, it is no longer within the power
of the defendant to avoid the injury.
However, it is a matter of public policy whether the defense of contributory
negligence should be further weakened by accepting such a rule of law. As long
as we impose a duty of vgilance upon a defendant, it would seem that we should
not excuse him because he negligently lacked the means to accomplish the very
thing for which we repire that vigilance. In the cases allowing recovery, it may
be that the defendant s fault involved a greater risk than the plaintiff's, and the
decisions represent attempts by the courts to apply a sort of comparative fault
rule." If this is correct, while the decisions may be desirable upon their facts, a
general application of the Loach rule would no more accomplish such a result
than does the last clear chance doctrine as conventionally applied, since then, a
plaintiff could recover although hIs fault is greater than the defendant's.
Jmsms C. BLAIR
"'Weitzman v. Nassau Electric R. Co., supra, note 13.
D -Csatlos v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 70 App. Div. 606, 75 N. Y. Supp. 583 (lIst
Dep't. 1902).
27Hewitt's Adm'r. v. Central Truckaway Svstem, 302 Ky. 459, 194 S. W 2d 999
(1946); Braden's Adm'x. v. Liston, 258 Ky. 44. 79 S. W 2d 241 (1934).
'Swift SL Co. v Thompson's Adm'r., 308 Ky. 529, 214 S. W 2d 758 (1948); sec
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Conley's Adm x., 261 Ky. 669, 676, 88 S. W. 2d 683, 686
(1935).
'Sullivan v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 117 Mo. 214, 23 S. W 149 (1893).
" British Columbia Electric Ry. v. Loach, supra, note 2.
"1 Maclntyre, Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1248 (1940).
-2 [1938] 1 IV. V R. 173 (Man.).
See supra, notes 7 & 8.
"See MacIntrye, supra, note 31 at 1249.
